**Note:** The following paragraph refers to Figure 1 which is found on p. 5.

1. Rashi (in סנהדרין; Source 3, p. 4), explains the “*מאי חזית*” logic, which is the reason that one must be killed rather than violate (יהרג ואל יעבור) the מצוה(i.e., the prohibition) of לא תרצח, as follows: The “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” is inoperative (or, inapplicable) in the “coerced murder” case (pp. 3-5) for the following reason: If ***α*** would murder ***β*** to save his own life (*“Option 1”* in Figure 1), there will be two negative consequences (“תרתי”): The loss of a Jewish life(***β****’s*life) and violation of a מצוה. On the other hand, if ***α*** remains passive(*“Option 2”* in Figure 1), there will only be one negative consequence (“חדא”): The loss of a Jewish life (***α****’s* life), but the מצוה will be observed.Therefore, as Rashi in יומא (Source B-1) states, *“But now if you kill* ***β****, since a Jew will be killed and a* מצוה *will be violated, why should it be acceptable in the eyes of Hashem to violate his* מצות*?”* The terminology which Rav Moshe describes (Reference 1) to formulate רש״י’s reasoning is*:* “תרתי-נגד-חדא”*–* “*two negative consequences vs. one negative consequence*”.

**Source B-1:** Rashi’s explanation of the “*מאי חזית*” logic: Inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”:

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| [רבא or רבה responds to ***α*** who asked if he may accede to the hooligan’s demand to kill ***β****]*: “What is the basis of your premise to permit [yourself to kill ***β****]*? Is it based on וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם?” | כלומר מאי דעתיך למשרי מילתא משום וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם ? |
| [Your premise is untrue because] the reason [for the “וחי בהם-dispensation”] is that Jewish lives are more precious to Hashemthan the מצות. Therefore, the Holy One, blessed be He, says, “let the מצוהbe abrogated (i.e., violated) and this person will live.” | טעמו של דבר לפי שחביבה נפשן של ישראל לפני המקום יותר מן המצות אמר ***הקדושׁ בּרוך הוא*** תבטל המצוה ויחיה זה. |
| But now [if you kill ***β****]*, since a Jew will be killed and the מצוה will be abrogated, why should it be acceptable in the eyes of Hashem to violate his מצות? | אבל עכשיו שיש כאן ישראל נהרג והמצוה בטילה למה ייטב בעיני המקום לעבור על מצותיו? |
| Why should your (***α****’*s) blood be more precious to Him [i.e., to Hashem] than the blood of your Jewish friend (***β***)? | למה יהיה דמך חביב עליו יותר מדם חבירך ישראל? |

רש״י יומא, דף פב ע”ב, ד״ה מאי חזית:

1. Rav Moshe comments, *“We can infer [from this* רש״י] *that with regard to this* דין *[of* יהרג ואל יעבור], *his (****α****’s) life and the life of his friend (****β****) are equal”* (Reference 2). Perhaps Rav Moshe’sinference is as follows: The reason for the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” is that Hashem preferspreservation ofJewish lives over His מצות since Jewish lives are more precious to Him (Rashi, above). If we accept the premise that all Jewish lives are deemed equal, it logically follows that the intent of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” cannot be met if ***α*** kills ***β*** to save himself, since the preservation of ***α****’s* own life will be nullified by the loss of ***β****’s* equally valued life. Therefore, since the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” is inapplicable, the מצוה of לא תרצח must be observed even at the cost of ***α****‘s* life. According to Rav Moshe’sunderstanding, apparently Rashi believes that in all “life-versus-life” standoffs, the Torah declares total equivalence between any two lives which is unalterable regardless of any apparent factor that might favor one life over the other. Accordingly, even if there was a method to discern that ***α****‘s* lifehas a higher value than ***β****’s* life, the inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” and thus, the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבורwould remain in place.
2. Therefore, according to רש״י, in a different “coerced murder” case where the hooligan orders ***α****,* “either kill ***β*** or I will kill both of you,” although ***β*** will certainly be killed in any event, it appears logical that ***α*** would be still forbidden to save his life by killing ***β*** because of the “תרתי-נגד-חדא”reasoning: If ***α*** remains passive, even though both ***α*** and ***β*** will die, this would still be classified as “חדא” *(“one type of negative consequence”),* without transgression of an עבירה. However, if ***α*** kills ***β***, there will be “תרתי” *(“two different negative consequences”)*: ***β****’s* deathand a transgression of an עבירה. Therefore, the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” is inapplicable and the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבורwould apply even if it is certain that ***β*** will be killed anyway.  Thus, on a fundamental level, since Rashi considers the inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” as the basis of the “מאי חזית” logic, whenever we have a “תרתי-נגד-חדא” situation, the “מאי חזית” logic, and thus, the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבורwill remain in force.
3. We discussed two approaches to understand the permissibility to hand over (מסירה) the *‘fugitive without escape capability’* (see Appendix A, p. 42, paragraph M)*.* 
   1. The *Chasdei Dovid* (Source 12, p. 12) explains since the fugitive will definitely be killed with the townspeople if he is not handed over, *“the logic of* ‘מאי חזית’ *does not apply when they all are in an equal state of danger.”* Since the “מאי חזית” logic is not applicable, the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבורwould also not apply and therefore, the townspeople are permitted to hand over the fugitive.
   2. However, according to Rav Moshe, the reason for the permissibility to hand over the *‘fugitive without escape capability’* is because he is considered as a רודף after the townspeople (Source 15, p. 17). Below (paragraph 6b, p. 47), we will suggest a possible reason why Rav Moshe does not explain in the same way as the *Chasdei Dovid.*
4. In II-1-C, pp. 3-4, we discussed two approaches for the “מאי חזית”logic and how it dictates the *Halacha* of יהרג ואל יעבור by שׁפיכת דמים.
   1. The (first opinion in the) *Talmedai Rabbeinu Yonah* (Source B-2) as explained by Rav Nochum Partzovitz, believes that the “מאי חזית”logic states since we do not know whose life is considered more valuable, therefore the uncertainty dictates that one must remain passive (שב ואל תעשה), even at the pain of his own death. According to this approach, if there was a way to definitively determine that ***α****’s* blood is redder than ***β****’s* blood, (i.e., that ***α****’s* life is definitively more valuable), since there is no uncertainty, perhaps that ***α***would be permitted to kill***β*** to save himself.

**Source B-2:** First explanation of the meaning of “*מאי חזית*” in the *Talmedai Rabbeinu Yonah*: The “*מאי חזית*” logic operates from a perspective of uncertainty (about the relative worth of the two lives):

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| תלמידי רבינו יונה, עבודה זרה דף כח ע”ב,  ד״ה דילמא דמא דחברך סומק טפי:  פירוש וכיון שדמו יותר אדום יחיה יותר ויקיים מצוות ויעשה רצונו של הקב״ה יותר על ידי החיים. וא״ת כיון שהדבר ספק יהרוג אותו ואל יהרג הוא י״ל שב ואל תעשה שאני שהאדם יש לו למנוע מלעשות שום עבירה בידים.  מעתה נפרש הדבר איך הוא, אם יאמר לו הגוי לך והרוג את פלוני, ואם לאו אותך נהרוג, אף על פי שיש כח ביד הגוי להרגו, יש לו להניח עצמו ליהרג ואל יהרגנו דדילמא דמא דחבריה סומק טפי, ויחיה יותר ויקיים מצוותיו של הקב״ה. זה דוקא כשאומר לו לך והרגנו ואם לאו אותך הרגתי ואותו החייתי, אז ודאי אין לו להרגו. אבל אם אומר הרוג אותו ואם לאו אותו ואותך הרגתי. כיון שהוא מוכתב למלכות וא״י שינצל, יהרגנו ואל יהרג כדאמדינן בתוספתא. | The explanation is since his (your friend, ***β****’*s)bloodis redder, he should continue to live and perform מצות. By living, he (***β****)* will continue to fulfill the will ofהקב״ה . If you will ask, since the matter lies in doubt [whose blood is redder], let ***α*** kill ***β*** so that he *(****α****)* will not be killed? The answer is [the loss of a life by] remaining passive is different [than loss of life through murder]: A person must refrain from actively transgressing a sin.  Now we will explain how the דין of יהרג ואל יעבור would apply: If the non-Jew tells you *(****α****)****,*** “Go and kill *so-and-so* (***β****)* or else I will kill you,” even though the non-Jew has the power to kill him *(****β****)*, [nonetheless], ***α*** must allow himself to be killed rather than kill ***β*** since perhaps his friend’s blood is more red and [therefore], ***β***should continue to live and perform the מצות ofהקב״ה . However, this only applies if the non-Jew tells you *(****α****)****,*** “Go and kill ***β*** or else I will kill you and I will allow ***β*** to live,” then certainly ***α*** may not kill ***β***. However, if the non-Jew tells ***α***, “Go and kill ***β*** or else I will kill both of you,” since ***β*** is condemned to die by the king and it is impossible for him to be saved, ***α*** should kill ***β*** rather than be killed (along with ***β****)* as stated in the תוספתא. |

* 1. However, Rashi, as explained by Rav Moshe, believes that the primary message of the “מאי חזית”logic is the inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”. When the Gemara used the words “מאי חזית”, it never meant to suggest that theדין of יהרג ואל יעבור could be influenced by any assessment of the relative worth of the two lives. As we quoted from Rav Moshe, Rashi is telling us that the two lives are always considered equal with respect to theדיןof יהרג ואל יעבור.In the same *Teshuva*, Rav Moshe writes, *“Therefore even if* ***α*** *is a* תלמיד חכם *and* ***β*** *is an* עם הארץ *(ignoramous), with regard to this ‘coerced murder’ situation,* ***β****’s blood is red in the eyes of Hashem and* ***α****’s blood is not red, for reasons that are not given to humans but are only known by Hashem Himself, Whose deeds are perfect”* (Reference 2). I am not certain exactly how Rav Moshe understands the words, *“perhaps the blood of that man is redder*”; perhaps רבא used those words merely to enable the threatened person *(****α****)* to comprehend, but in reality, the relative worth of the lives is not the determining factor for the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבור. However, this is not a satisfying answer since Rashi weaves in the theme of, *“Why should your blood be more precious to Him [i.e., to Hashem] than the blood of your Jewish friend?”* in each of the tractates in which theדיןof יהרג ואל יעבור is discussed. Clearly, this theme somehow works in conjunction with the inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”, but unfortunately, I have not merited to understand the mechanism.

**Note:** The following comment should be viewed only as conjecture:

Although *Rav Moshe* stated earlier in the same *Teshuva,* *“with regard to this* דין *of* יהרג ואל יעבור*, his (****α****’s) life and the life of his friend (****β****) are equal,”* this should not be construed as a contradiction to his statement, *“****β****’s blood is red in the eyes of Hashem and* ***α****’s blood is not.”*  The latter statement is not addressing the relative worth of the two lives, but rather, points out that the Heavenly death sentence was decreed for ***α***and not for ***β***. It merely comes to deflect a hypothetical claim by ***α*** that, “I am more meritorious than ***β*** and thus, more derserving of life.” If we were to honor such a claim (e.g., if ***α***is aתלמיד חכםand***β***is anעם הארץ), one could (hypothetically) argue that this is not a “תרתי-נגד-חדא” situation, but rather, a “חדא-נגד-חדא” *(“one negative consequence against one negative consequence”)* situation, as follows: If ***α*** would actively kill ***β***, the loss of ***β****’s* life would perhaps not register as a negative consequence due to its inferior value (relative to ***α****’s* life). Thus, there is only a transgression of לא תרצח, which would be counted as “חדא” (one negative consequence). If, on the other hand, ***α*** remains passive, the consequent loss of ***α****’s* life would also be counted as “חדא”. We might contend that such a “חדא-נגד-חדא” situation is indistinguishable from any other עבירה which may be pushed aside for the preservation of life (פיקוח נפש). To deflect such an argument, *Rav Moshe* states that in any “coerced murder” case, the relative merits of ***α*** and ***β*** are irrelevant because we see that the Heavenly decree is upon ***α***to die and not upon ***β***. Having negated this hypothetical argument, we return to our basic premise that the lives of ***α*** and ***β*** are deemed equally worthy. Accordingly, we have a “תרתי-נגד-חדא” situation and the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” is inoperative. Thus, *Rav Moshe’s* statement, *“his (****α****’s) life and the life of his friend (****β****) are equal,*” and the consequent inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”, remain the core principles that determine theדין ofיהרג ואל יעבור in the “coerced murder” case according to רש״י.

1. Perhaps the two approaches to explain the permissibility to hand over the *‘fugitive without escape capability’* are related to the two ways to understand the “מאי חזית”logic:
   1. The *Chasdei Dovid*, who states that the “מאי חזית”logic does not apply when the fugitive cannot escape, would likely subscribe to first opinion in the *Talmedai Rabbeinu Yonah*. The “מאי חזית”logic dictates that as long as we are concerned that ***β****’s* blood may possibly be more red than ***α****’s* blood, the uncertainty forbids ***α*** from killing him. However, if ***β*** (or the fugitive) is certain to die anyway, the relative “redness” of his blood (i.e., relative worth of his life) is irrelevant since he cannot be saved regardless of townspeople’s actions. Since theדיןof יהרג ואל יעבור is based on the “מאי חזית” logic, if this logic is not applicable, it is permitted to hand over the fugitive. Similarly, the *Talmedai Rabbeinu Yonah* state if the gentile orders ***α***, “either kill ***β*** or I will kill both of you,” if ***β*** was condemned to die by the king, ***α*** would be permitted to kill ***β*** (apparently with his own hands) (Source B-2). In the context of their preceding words, it seems clear that their reasoning is that the “מאי חזית”logic does not apply when ***β*** is certain to die either way.
   2. Perhaps the reason Rav Moshe offers a different explanation (to permit מסירה) than that advanced by the *Chasdei Dovid*, is because he understands from Rashi that theדיןof יהרג ואל יעבור is not based on any uncertainty about the relative worth of the respective lives, but rather, on the “תרתי-נגד-חדא”reasoning. Therefore, even if the fugitive will definitely be killed regardless of the townspeople’s actions, the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” will not apply and thus, the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבורwould prohibit handing him over, as discussed above in paragraph 3 (p. 44). The *Bach* (ב״ח, authored by Rav Yoel Sirkes; Source B-3) appears to take a similar approach in answering the question of the כסף משׁנה on רישׁ לקישׁ. Therefore, Rav Moshe explains, it is only because of the דין רודף that the townspeople are permitted to hand over the *‘fugitive without escape capability’.*

**Source B-3:** The ב״ח’s answer of the כסף משׁנה’s question about the prohibition to hand over the fugitive:

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| שו"ת בית חדש (ב״ח) (ישנות) סימן מג:  ולא קשיא, טעמא מאי דהלא עיקר הטעם במאי דקאמר מאי חזית דדמך סומקא טפי וכו' אינו אלא כדפירש רש״י ... כיון שיש כאן ישראל נהרג והמצוה בטלה למה ייטב בעיני המקום שתעבור על מצוה, למה יהא דמך חביב עליו יותר מדמו של זה, וע"כ כולם יהו נהרגין ולא תתבטל המצוה . אבל היכא דמחויב מיתה דאיהו גרם לנפשיה, דמו בראשו ואין אנו נתפסין בדמיו ומותר למסרו, ואין אני קורא בזה דלא תתבטל המצוה דאיהו גופיה קא בטיל ליה מצוה זו על ידי מעשיו שגרם מיתה לעצמו.. | [The ב״ח addresses the question of the כסף משׁנה *(see Supplement 1, p. 56),* who asks: Why does רישׁ לקישׁ prohibit handing over a fugitive who is not חייב מיתה, if he has no escape capability: *“The logic of* ‘מאי חזית’ *does not apply since the designated fugitive will be killed along with everyone else if they do not give him over?”*  The ב״ח answers this question, as follows]:  This is not a difficulty since the primary reason for the “*מאי חזית*” logic is as רש״י (Source B-1, p. 43) explains: *“[If* ***α*** *would kill* ***β*** *to save himself], since a Jew (****β****) will be killed and the* מצוה *(i.e.,* לא תרצח) *will be violated, why should it be acceptable in the eyes of Hashem that you (****α****) should violate the* מצוה*? Why should your (****α****) blood be more precious to Him than the blood of this person (****β****)?”* Therefore, [if the fugitive is not חייב מיתה], all of [the townspeople] should be killed so that the מצוה will not be abrogated. However, if he is חייב מיתה, he caused [the danger] for himself and therefore, his blood is on his head. We should not become ensnared because of his blood and it is permitted to hand him over. We do not describe this as [a situation] where the מצוה is abrogated [if we hand him over] since he himself abrogated this מצוה through his actions, whereby he caused the death for himself. |

1. With this same reasoning, Rav Moshe would maintain that, even if by some *Halachic* “gauge”, one could assess that ***β****’s* level oflife is definitively lower than ***α****’s* level of life, the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבור would remain in force since the “תרתי-נגד-חדא”reasoning, and thus, the inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” would still hold true. However, according to first opinion mentioned in the *Talmedai Rabbeinu Yonah*, and presumably the *Chasdei Dovid*, since the “מאי חזית”logic is operative only if we are concerned that ***β****’s* life may be more valuable than ***α****’s* life, if we are certain that the opposite is true, the “מאי חזית”logic, and thus, the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבור, does not apply. Killing an unborn fetus or aטריפה (person with only transient life remaining, due to an illness or injury) does not incur capital punishment, whereas killing a שלם (person with normal life expectancy) incurs capital punishment. According to those who understand that the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבור is based on the uncertainty about whose life is more valuable, if ***β*** is an unborn fetus or aטריפה and the hooligan threatens ***α*** to either kill ***β*** or be killed, perhaps ***α*** would be permitted to kill ***β*** to save his own life since here it is known that ***α****’s* life is “more valuable”. However, if the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבור is based on the inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”, this *Halacha* would still be in effect (i.e., ***α*** would be prohibited to kill ***β****)* even though a *Halachic* “gauge” tells us that ***α****’s* life is at a higher level than ***β****’s* life.
   1. The *Minchat Chinuch* states that, in the fugitive case, if aטריפה was in the town, the townspeople would be permitted to hand him over even if the hooligans did not single anyone out, *“because the* *logic of ‘why do you presume that your blood is more red etc.’* (‘מאי חזית’) *does not apply since certainly the townspeople’s blood is more red”* (Reference 3).This position is also stated by the *Meiri* (Reference 4).
   2. By contrast, we have seen that Rav Moshe describes *“the advantage that the mother has over the fetus, that she is a complete* נפש *while he is not yet a complete* נפש,” which is based on *“the fact that one does not incur capital liability (for killing an unborn fetus)”* (Source 17, p. 21). Nonetheless, Rav Moshe does not rationalize that feticide is permissible because the “*מאי חזית*” logic does not apply*.*  If not for theדין רודף , the דיןof יהרג ואל יעבור would have prohibited killing even the *‘non-emerged fetus’,* per Rav Moshe’s understanding of the Rambam (Reference 5). Similarly, Rav Shach writes (explaining the same Rambam), *“Even though killing the mother is subject to the death penalty whereas killing a ‘non-emerged fetus’ is not, nonetheless, since feticide is included under the* רציחה איסור (prohibition against murder), *both the fetus and mother are equal with regard to the* רציחה איסור *and thus, the* סברא *of* ‘*מאי חזית*’ *would apply*” (Reference 6). Even though Rav Shach explicitly states, *“the blood of a born person is redder than the blood of an unborn person because the murder of a born person is punishable by death whereas the murder of an unborn person is not,”* he still believes that the logic of“*מאי חזית*” would have prohibited killing the *‘non-emerged fetus’* if not for theדין רודף , which appears to align with Rav Moshe’s understanding.
   3. Moreover, Rav Moshe states, *“it is obvious that we would apply the* דין *of* יהרג ואל יעבור *if hooligans attempt to coerce a* שלם *to kill a*טריפה ,” even though murdering a healthy person is punishable by the death penalty while murdering aטריפה is not (Reference 5). The *Nodeh B’Yehuda* takes the same position (Reference 7). Thus, Rav Moshe’s position is consistent that theדיןof יהרג ואל יעבור is fundamentally unrelated to the relative worth of the respective lives, but rather, on the inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”, in accordance with Rashi’s understanding.
2. In a similar way, Rav Shmuel Rozovsky (Reference 8), based on the commentary of Rav Chaim Soloveitchik on the Rambam, explains that Rashi does not believe the meaning of the “*מאי חזית*” logic is that the ***פיקוח נפש*** imperatives of ***α*** and ***β*** oppose each other equally and therefore, ***α*** must remain passive to avoid actively negating ***β****‘s* ***פיקוח נפש*** imperative. Rather, Rashi (in פסחים, Source B-4) understands that the meaning of the “*מאי חזית*” logic is since the lives of ***α*** and ***β*** are equal and one life will be lost in any event, therefore, ***α*** has no ***פיקוח נפש*** imperative at all (i.e., the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation” does not even exist here) since the entire basis for the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”, i.e., that Jewish lives are precious to Hashem, is not applicable in this situation.

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| [רבה responds to ***α*** who asked if he may kill ***β*** to save himself]: “You are coming to ask [if you may kill ***β****]* because you know that no מצוה stands in the way of פיקוח נפש. Therefore, you believe that this [prohibition against murder] should also be pushed aside because of your פיקוח נפש.” | כלומר כלום באתה לישאל על כך אלא מפני שאתה יודע שאין מצוה עומדת בפני פיקוח נפש וסבור אתה שאף זו תדחה מפני פיקוח נפשך |
| [However, this premise is untrue because] this [עבירה ofלא תרצח] is unlike other עבירות, since one life will be lost in any event. | אין זו דומה לשאר עבירות דמ”מ יש כאן אבוד נפש. |
| And the תורה only permitted pushing aside a מצוה [based on the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”] because of the preciousness of a Jewish life. | והתורה לא התירה לדחות את המצוה אלא מפני חיבת נפשו של ישראל. |
| But, here [if you kill ***β****]*, an עבירה will be transgressed and a life will be lost. | וכאן עבירה נעשית ונפש אבודה. |
| Who says that your (***α****’*s) life is more precious to Hashem than ***β****’s* life? Maybe ***β****’s* life is more precious to Him? | מי יאמר שנפשך חביבה לפני המקום יותר משל זה? דילמא של זה חביבה טפי עליו? |
| And consequently, an עבירה will be transgressed and a life will be lost. | ונמצא עבירה נעשית ונפש אבודה. |

**Source B-4:** Rashi’s explanation of the “*מאי חזית*” logic: Inapplicability of the “וחי בהם*-*dispensation”:

רש״י פסחים דף כה ע”ב, ד״ה מאי חזית:

References

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| 1 | *Igros Moshe, Yoeh De’ah,* *Chelek* 1, *Siman* 145  *(See Supplement 2, pp. 86-87, for excerpts and translation).* |
| 2 | *Igros Moshe, Yoeh De’ah,* *Chelek* 2, *Siman* 174, *Anaf* 4  *(See Supplement 2, pp. 83-85, for excerpts and translation).* |
| 3 | *Minchat Chinuch,* Mitzvah 296  *(See Supplement 1, Source 3, p. 52, for an excerpt and translation).* |
| 4 | Rav Menachem Ha'Meiri, *Beis Ha'bechira,* Sanhedrin 74b |
| 5 | *Igros Moshe, Choshen Mishpat*, *Chelek* 2, *Siman* 69, *Ohs* 1-2  *(See Supplement 2, pp. 63-66, for excerpts and translation).* |
| 6 | *Avi Ezri al HaRambam, Hilchot Rotzeach U’Shmirat Nefesh, Perek* 1, *Halachot* 6, 9  *(See Supplement 4, pp. 93-97, for an excerpt and translation).* |
| 7 | *She’alot U’Teshuvot Nodeh B’Yehuda Tinyona, Choshen Mishpat, Siman* 59 |
| 8 | חידושי רבי שמואל )רוזובסקי (על מסכת פסחים, סימן יב׳׃ בענין יהרג ואל יעבור |